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Abstract

Given the sheer number of stories that permeate each and every culture, it seems
impossible to deny the profound effect that storytelling has on our lives. Previous
research, exploring the relationship between personal frames and human rights
campaigns, concludes that exposure to a story involving an individual’s victimization will
most successfully mobilize support for that campaign. However, there has not yet been
any systematic research to determine whether personal narratives will mobilize support
when a campaign is not philanthropic in nature, but instead inherently violent and
destructive. This study, therefore, examines how certain messaging strategies influence
support for the use of violence by violent non-state actors. I tested the efficacy of
personal frames using an experimental research design in which participants were
randomly assigned to the control group (shown no personal narrative) or one of the four
treatment groups and shown varying accounts of a young girl, who joins a “resistance”
group following the death of her mother. I then surveyed respondents on their attitudes,
emotions and their willingness to support violence. Results demonstrate that amplified
personal frames, containing humanizing language and/or vivid details of the injustice, are
most effective in generating consensus mobilization towards the use of violence by
violent non-state actors.
Étant donné le grand nombre d'histoires qui imprègnent chaque culture, il semble
impossible de nier l'effet profond que la narration a sur nos vies. Des recherches
antérieures, explorant la relation entre les images personnelles et des campagnes des
droits de l'homme, conclut que l'exposition à une histoire impliquant la victimisation d'un
individu sera le plus grand succès de mobiliser le soutien pour cette campagne.
Cependant, il n'y a pas encore eu de recherches systématiques pour déterminer si des
récits personnels vont mobiliser le soutien quand une campagne est non philanthropique
dans la nature, mais intrinsèquement violentes et destructrices. Cette étude examine donc
comment certaines stratégies de messagerie influent soutien à l'utilisation de la violence
par des acteurs non-étatiques violents. Je l'ai testé l'efficacité des cadres personnels à
l'aide d'une conception de la recherche expérimentale dans laquelle les participants ont
été assignés au hasard au groupe de contrôle (montré aucune narration personnelle) ou
l'un des quatre groupes de traitement et montré différents comptes d'une jeune fille, qui se
joint à une «résistance» groupe après la mort de sa mère. Je puis sondé les répondants sur
leurs attitudes, les émotions et leur volonté de soutenir la violence. Les résultats
démontrent que les cadres personnels amplifiés, contenant un langage humanisant et / ou
détails saisissants de l'injustice, sont les plus efficaces pour générer la mobilisation de
consensus en vue de l'utilisation de violence par des acteurs non-étatiques violents.
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Chapter One: Introduction
He glides across the floor with the swift grace of an expert swordsman, clutching
his bloody wounds and invoking the illustrious phrase over and over, his voice growing
stronger with determination. “Hello, my name is Inigo Montoya, you killed my father,
prepare to die!” As a child, during this scene from the beloved film, “The Princess
Bride,” I would erupt in applause once Inigo, the hero, finally got his revenge against the
evil nobleman who murdered his father. Irrespective of the violence that ensued, I felt as
though Inigo had somehow set the world back into balance with this vengeful act.
Though I did not know it yet, I had learned a valuable lesson in the powerful role that
storytelling plays in the construction of our reality.
When looking at the course of human history, the influence of stories cannot be
understated. The ancient Greeks used storytelling to interpret their chaotic world, creating
a rich society and civilization that would be studied for centuries to come. The tale of
events at the Boston Tea Party in 1773 sparked the political upheaval that became the
American Revolution, summoning with it the eminent slogan, “No taxation without
representation!” Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany established a notorious narrative that led to
the systematic extermination of about six million Jews and the deadliest war in our
history. In the prelude to the Rwandan Genocide, the Hutu political elite reinforced preexisting ethnic tensions with “us versus them” rhetoric and hate speech, constructing a
formidable divide between the Tutsis and the Hutus and effectively legitimizing the 100day massacre that took the lives of an estimated 800,000 people. Our complex history
suggests that as long as there are people willing to use violence, there will also be
narratives created to support it.

2
This theoretical link between narratives and violent behavior has largely been
unexplored by scholars and policymakers alike. While perhaps many have questioned
why someone would ultimately risk their life to participate in a violent movement, few
have systematically analyzed the isolated effects of various messaging strategies on
support for such movements. Yet, as thousands flock to war-torn Syria to join the ranks
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or “ISIS,” gaining a better understanding of the
motivations and objectives of violent non-state group’s propaganda seems of paramount
importance. Thus, in the following Independent Study Thesis, I endeavor to address some
of these critical gaps in examining which kinds of narratives are most effective in
galvanizing support for violent non-state actors. I am investigating these enigmatic
relationships in pursuit, not of a panacea to violence, but of an increased awareness of
how certain messages impact mobilization towards violence.
Chapter two contextualizes my research question through a discussion of three
dominant schools of thought regarding mobilization around high-risk social movements
in relation to the process of “framing.” In chapter three, I present my methodological
approach for testing the hypotheses, as well as outlining the advantages and
disadvantages of my chosen experimental research design. The results from the statistical
analyses are presented and discussed in chapter four. Chapter five concludes the thesis,
contributing new insights regarding the role of messages in mobilizing support for violent
non-state actors.
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Chapter Two: Theory and Literature Review
Meet Leila. Leila and her family were forced to flee their home following the
emergence of a civil war. After years living in abject poverty, Leila wishes to return home
and strongly supports the principle of political agency for herself and her fellow people.
An organization holds similar beliefs and advocates to this cause. In fact, it was just
announced that this group is recruiting new members to engage in an “armed struggle”
to obtain autonomy. Will Leila join the movement despite the risks or decide to stay
home?
For centuries, sociologists, economists, psychologists and political scientists have
ventured to predict and explain human behavior in regards to high-risk collective action.
The relevant social movement literature can be conceptually divided into three “schools”
of thought – grievances, rational choice theory and emotional engagements. Some have
argued that these approaches are rival or incompatible, yet there is little empirical
evidence to suggest that there is a single explanation for participation in collective
violence, thus they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, each theory speaks to the other in
an effort to build a more cohesive framework with which to better understand the
preconditions and determinants for high-risk collective action. Throughout this chapter, I
will first examine each school of thought chronologically in order to better evaluate the
progression and growth of collective action theory, while identifying the research gaps or
weaknesses that exist within each theoretical argument. Next, I will discuss how certain
social movement actors carefully construct powerful, emotion-laden messages through a
process known as “framing,” in order to motivate individuals to engage in collective
action.
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The Grievance Approach
Aristotle wrote in his fifth book within the philosophical work Politics, “The
cause of revolution always is to be found in [relative] inequality,” laying the foundation
for the first conceptual framework linking grievances to participation in collective
violence (as cited in Kort, 1952, 486). Largely explored by scholars of revolution and
rebellion, this approach highlights the motivations rooted in an individual’s discontent
with his or her economic position in society relative to others (Humphreys and Weinstein,
2008). Since Aristotle, certain scholars have speculated as to whether the mere presence
of grievances stemming from inequality, such as landlessness, unemployment and
marginalization from political decision-making, can sufficiently explain why individuals
mobilize towards violence. Rather than comparing one’s position with others in society,
these theorists posited that in order for participation to occur, individuals judge their
circumstances relative to their own expectations of what they deserve, a mechanism
known as “relative deprivation” (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). There are several variations
of this basic argument. Karl Marx, for example, identified social class as the critical
determinant of participation, proposing that individuals’ shared experiences of
exploitation would result in revolution against the capitalist system (Marx, 1848). Others
focus on cultural differences between ethnic groups to explain participation in collective
violence (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008, 440).
The presence of individual grievances seem, at least, a necessary condition for
collective violence, as individuals who become involved with such movements often cite
instances of perceived injustices, discrimination and oppression as principal reasons for
their involvement. For example, in their survey research with 441 individuals in
communities across Afghanistan, Reza Fazli, Casey Johnson and Peyton Cooke found
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that survey respondents consistently emphasized the importance of grievances, namely
marginalization and corrupt governance, as drivers of their participation in a violent
extremist group (Fazli et al., 2015, 7). “Relative deprivation” is observed to be most
prevalent in environments where expectations from recent economic development or
progress are heightened (Sigelman and Simpson, 1977). A well-known example comes
from the precarious years leading up to the Iranian Revolution of 1979. One scholar
writes, “The conspicuous consumption on the part of Iranian high society…produced an
acute sense of relative deprivation,” creating widespread frustration and discontent
among the middle and lower classes (Arjomand, 1986, 397). Thus, given the
interconnected state of the world today, where the effects of globalization allow for quick
and easy access to information with which to assess our subjective “relative deprivation,”
one should observe widespread collective violence. Yet, even in environments plagued
with considerable inequality, grievances are often not sufficient to mobilize participation
in high-risk collective action.
Rational Choice Theory
Turning decades of scholarship on its head, Mancur Olson applied rational choice
theory to explain why the rational, self-interested individuals will not bear the costs of
participation when faced with the choice to engage in general collective action (Olson,
1965). Often referred to as the “public goods problem,” Olson’s framework simply
argues that while the choice to mobilize could be mutually beneficial, if enjoyment of the
benefits is not contingent on participation (a public good), individuals will instead choose
to free ride on the contributions of others, sharing in the benefits, and yet absorbing none
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of the costs (1965). The burgeoning of these individual cost-benefit analyses is at the
center of the dilemma, known as the ‘collective action problem’ (Lichbach, 1995).
Once a movement employs the use of violence, the perceived costs of
participation rise even higher and plummet the probability of individuals engaging in
collective action. Indeed, Jeremy M. Weinstein in his research on rebel recruitment
writes, “rebel leaders face an uphill battle in convincing individuals to rebel,” as the
majority of the benefits of a victory will be experienced independent of participation and
the risks, including loss of life, provide every reason not to partake in such a movement”
(Weinstein, 2005, 600). To account for collective action observed in practice, however,
Olson explained that individuals would indeed take the risk and engage in collective
action if leaders offer selective incentives as a reward for participation (Olson, 1965;
Lichbach, 1995). He writes, “the incentive must be “selective” so that those who do not
join the organization working for the group’s interest…can be treated differently from
those who do” (Olson, 1965, 51).
These private “inducements to participation” have been catalogued across a
variety of contexts and studies (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). In 1979, Samuel
Popkin observed that the use of incentives, in the form of “material benefits,” was a
central strategy in gaining peasant support during the rebellion in Vietnam (Popkin,
1979). These potential material benefits ranged from access to land, positions of
authority, forms of protection and “loot” (money). Although the role of selective
incentives in motivating participation in collective action is now widely accepted, one
study conducted by Jeremy M. Weinstein revealed that certain incentives might prove
problematic for the long-term goals of the armed group.
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Differentiating between high-commitment recruits, “investors” and lowcommitment recruits, “consumers,” Weinstein’s work suggests that the “consumers,”
who join rebel groups on the basis of short-term rewards, “are unwilling to make
investments of time, energy, and resources without receiving the material rewards they
have been promised” (Weinstein, 2005, 621). Given this shortcoming of material
incentives, Weinstein explains that rebel leaders have adopted and continue to utilize
non-material rewards or “pull factors,” such as the emotional or spiritual benefits which
affiliation with a group may confer in order to attract “investors” to their organization
(Fazli et al., 2015, Weinstein, 2005). These “pull factors” may vary from the promise of
accruing social capital, such as a promotion to a position of authority, to simply the
benefit of protection and security in an otherwise unpredictable, tumultuous living
environment (Fazli et al., 2015; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). Still, Olson’s theory
only requires that the benefits of joining outweigh the costs of participation which other
empirical research has shown, may not always be the principle calculation for
involvement.
Emotional Engagements
Drawing from interviews with approximately 200 supporters of the insurgency
from the civil war in El Salvador, Elisabeth Wood concluded that the conventional
explanations for ‘insurgent collective action’ (i.e. material benefits or widening political
opportunity) could not adequately explain mobilization in the Salvadoran context. In this
case, Wood found that the majority of those who actively participated in abetting of the
insurgents had virtually nothing to gain, yet everything to lose. Rather, her study revealed
that a visceral emotion, which she calls “moral outrage,” cultivated from the “injustice of
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landlessness and the brutal measures taken to ensure it,” provided a powerful, initial
motivation to mobilize against the elite (Wood, 2003, 18). Historically, scholars of social
movements and collective action have been reluctant to theorize about the role that
emotions play in stimulating violent conflicts. Instead, emotions were often deemed as an
irrational and/or irrelevant approach to explaining “big phenomena” such as social
movements (Jasper, 1998). Yet, the conceptual and empirical research that has been
conducted clearly identifies the “causal force” of emotions in emerging collective action.
Jeff Goodwin and Steven Pfaff maintain, “the key causal factors that analysts of
social movements emphasize…social networks, grievances, collective identities, cultural
frames and ideologies, even shifting political opportunity structure – derive much of their
causal power from the strong emotions that they embody or evoke among actors”
(Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001, 282). Indeed, in his conceptual analysis of emotions in
protest, James Jasper finds that emotions are ubiquitous to all social life and that “without
them, there might be no social action at all” (Jasper, 1998, 398). Additionally, Jasper
distinguishes between both “transitory, context-specific emotions,” which are reactions to
new information and events, and the more stable “affective bonds or loyalties,” from
preexisting cultural ties and individual idiosyncrasies (Jasper, 1998). Transitory or
“reactive emotions,” such as anger, grief, and outrage, are of particular interest to my
study, as these are the emotions that are subject to manipulation. In order to spur
participation, leaders strategically construct messages to gain the “hearts and minds” of
their target audiences through a process known as “framing.”
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Framing Theory
Erving Goffman first introduced the concept of “framing” and compared it to that
of a camera, which has the ability to change focus in order to describe an event
(Goffman, 1974, 8). Over the years, scholars who examine the processes of framing have
tweaked its definition, yet the central idea remains unchanged. Snow and Benford define
a frame as an “interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’
by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and
sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment” (Snow and Benford,
1992, 137). According to Robert Entman in his summary of this field, “To frame is to
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”
(Entman, 1993, 52). In essence, frames function to organize experiences and guide action
(Snow et al., 1986). Based on the scholarship, the observed effects of framing support its
conceptualization and emphasize its importance in creating strong emotional reactions
that stimulate mobilization.
Perhaps the most prominent method to observe the effects of framing in the
literature has been to examine the relationship between the media discourse and public
opinion. In these studies, where the researchers operationalize various news frames and
present them to survey participants, the results indicate that frames do indeed have a
significant impact on individual’s perceptions, beliefs or attitudes towards the issues
discussed in the frame presented (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gamson et al., 1992;
Entman, 1993; Nelson et al., 1997; Druckman 2001; Pan and Kosicki, 1993). For
example, in the archetypical study observing the tolerance for a public Ku Klux Klan
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rally, Nelson, Clawson and Oxley find that their experimental group exposed to a “free
speech” news frame expressed more tolerance for the KKK rally, while those exposed to
a “public safety” news frame expressed less tolerance for the rally. The implication of
these studies is clear – frames matter, in that they affect how individuals process
information and assign larger sociopolitical or cultural meaning to their own experiences
(McEntire et al., 2015).
Framing and Mobilization Towards Violence
“Violent non-state actors” (VNSAs), or individuals or groups that are not a part of
the state and utilize violence as a strategy to achieve their goals, understand this powerful
relationship between the media and the stories they tell. The relevant discourse involving
VNSAs suggests that they regard both the mass media and new media as very powerful
tools to legitimize or justify their movement, spread messages to reach potential recruits,
as well as intimidate opponents (Griset and Mahan, 2003; Moghaddam, 2005; Corman
and Schiefelbein, 2006). A British radical Islamist effectively illustrated this belief in an
article, published by The New Yorker by stating, “You can’t do what the prophets of old
did, which was to stand on the hills and the mountains and address people,” he said, “The
hills and mountains today are Sky News, CNN, Fox News, the BBC” (Taub, 2015).
Moreover, with the introduction of new media, VNSAs, particularly the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria, have become adept at using social media platforms, like Twitter, to
rapidly disseminate their messages to reach a mass audience and attract new recruits
(Byman and Shapiro, 2014; Berger and Morgan, 2015).
Even though the introduction of new media platforms has altered the speed and
reach with which VNSAs can propagate their messages, the elemental structure of the
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propaganda remains unchanged. VNSAs are tasked with generating persuasive frames to
bring individuals’ views on the issues at hand in line with their own, a process known as
“consensus mobilization” (Klandermans 1984). As consensus mobilization is at least a
necessary condition of action mobilization, the efficacy of a mobilization campaign in
persuading the individual is a key determinant of participation. In order to succeed in this
persuasion, Snow and Benford build on previous theoretical work and distinguish three
“core framing tasks” (2000).
The first task, known as “diagnostic framing,” expands on what Gamson referred
to as “injustice frames,” which ultimately work to create an adversary by identifying
“victims” and then amplifying their victimization (Gamson, 1992). The diagnostic frame,
therefore, articulates the “problem” and attributes blame to construct both protagonists
and antagonists in a given narrative. Snow and Benford maintain the importance of this
particular frame, finding that injustice frames appeared to be “fairly ubiquitous across
movements advocating some form of political and/or economic change” (Snow and
Benford, 2000, 616). Prognostic framing, the second core framing task, then projects a
solution or plan to address the identified problem. In the final core framing task,
motivational framing, movement leaders provide a salient rationale for participation in
their movement. Taken together, Snow and Benford argue that these core framing tasks
attend to the interrelated problems of both consensus and action mobilization (Snow and
Benford, 2000; Gamson, 1992). And although scholars maintain that, “framing processes
have come to be regarded…as a central dynamic in understanding the character and
course of social movements,” there has been little, if any, empirical research concerning
the isolated effects of these various frames on the level of mobilization to support or
engage in collective violence – a necessary precondition for creating strategies to combat
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it (Snow and Benford, 2000, 612). As collective violence is not a new phenomenon,
however, one can trace how certain framing techniques have manifested in the “real
world,” by reviewing some of the rhetoric utilized by leaders of VNSAs.
On April 19th 1980, a professor of philosophy named Abimael Guzmán delivered
his infamous speech, “We are the initiators.” This charismatic leader and orator instilled a
“fierce sense of destiny” into his followers, effectively launching the collective armed
struggle of the Shining Path against the Peruvian government during which an estimated
69,000 were killed or disappeared (Starn et al., 2005, 320). In an effort to propose a
solution or plan to the “problem,” Guzmán employed a prognostic frame and declared to
his supporters that revolution was the only path to bringing about a new world order.
Creating a vision for the future, Guzmán explained, “The people rear up, arm themselves,
and rise in revolution to put the noose around the neck of imperialism and the
reactionaries, seizing and garroting them by the throat” (as cited in Starn et al., 2005,
328). Using a motivational frame, he emphasized the urgency of this plan, a “call to
arms” as it were, proclaiming,
“It has fallen to these men of today, these men that breathe, toil, and combat, the
task of sweeping the reactionaries from the face of the earth. It is the most luminous
and glorious mission ever entrusted to any generation…Comrades, the hour has
arrived. There is nothing to discuss. Debate has ended. It is time for action. The future
lies in guns and cannons! The armed revolution has begun! Glory to Marxist-LeninistMao Zedong Thought! Let us initiate the armed struggle!” (as cited in Starn et al.,
2005, 329)

Perhaps most importantly, Guzmán accounts for the “diagnostic frame,” by
articulating the many, profound injustices against the “masses” and amplifying their
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victimization. He refers to the masses as “history’s orphans” who have been “exploited,
subjugated, implacably oppressed” (as cited in Starn et al., 2005, 326). In emphasizing
this victimization, Guzmán transformed what people once considered an unfortunate
condition of their life into a salient injustice (Snow et al. 1986). To complete the
diagnostic frame, Guzmán attributes blame, thus creating a malevolent antagonist for his
movement to fight against - “This class grows in combat out of capitalism: a sinister
system that sweats blood and filth from all its pores” (as cited in Starn et al., 2005, 326).
Although this particular example portrays an abstract concept, “capitalism,” as the
antagonist, there are cases in which the boundary between “good” and “evil” is framed as
somewhat less ambiguous.
For example, in the case of the armed insurgency in El Salvador, the state’s
repression was severe and served as ample motivation or fuel for the resistance’s
propaganda effort. One child recalls, “They burned the houses and fields, they poisoned
the water and killed whomever they saw. They took people out at night and disappeared
them. During each invasion people were killed; perhaps a majority of the people died –
pregnant mothers, kids, all and everyone” (Wood, 2003, 94). If the state does not use
repressive tactics, however, VNSAs might also engage in “disinformation” campaigns,
where they actively spread rumors, casting their opponents as immoral, duplicitous or
evil in order to create an exaggerated fear of “the other,” a common tactic used in ethnic
conflicts to encourage violence (Goodwin and Pfaff, 2001, 284). In his book, “Agents of
Atrocity,” Neil J. Mitchell maintains, “Leaders justify policies and provide excuses for
their actions to motivate their agents…They need to persuade their agents, with argument
and evidence, that what they are doing is appropriate or even necessary” (Mitchell, 2004,
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43). As a result, adherents of VNSAs often consider their violent strategy to be a moral
and righteous necessity.
Such efforts would be wasted, however, if it weren’t for the effective targeting
and adaptation of messages to respective audiences. In his report on “The Virtual
‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,” Charlie Winter writes,
“there is no one-size-fits-all messaging strategy for any political movement, jihadist or
otherwise” (Winter, 2015, 32). Thus, VNSAs employ “the most fundamental rule of any
communication effort,” - adapting their messages to select or target audiences so as to
better tap into those stable “affective bonds or loyalties,” formed from preexisting
cultural identities, and elicit a strong emotional response (Corman and Schiefelbein,
2006, 10; Jasper, 1998). The effective construction of the diagnostic frame works to
amplify the perceived injustice of individuals’ experiences, inciting an almost visceral
emotional response and rationale for participation.
In this way, “personal frames” can be understood as a type of diagnostic frame.
The personal frame focuses on a single, “identifiable” victim, rather than a group of
“unidentified” or “statistical” victims (Small and Loewenstein, 2003; Kogut and Ritov,
2005). Several studies, which explore the relationship between personal frames and
charitable behavior, suggest that when people are exposed to a story involving one
person’s victimization, they will feel more sympathetic and will be more likely to
contribute to the cause (McEntire et al., 2015; Small and Loewenstein, 2003). Indeed, in
her book “It was like a fever: storytelling in protest and politics,” Francesca Polletta
observes, “personal stories chip away at the public wall of indifference,” eliciting an
emotional and empathetic response that makes people feel the need to act on behalf of the
suffering of others (Polletta, 2006). Unsurprisingly, people are more likely to care when
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the victims in the frame are “innocent women and children,” groups that are often
portrayed as synonymous with vulnerable civilians (Carpenter, 2005).
As a result, human rights organizations often employ personal narratives or
frames to mobilize support and participation in their campaigns. Previous empirical
research has established that these personal frames are more effective at mobilizing
support than other types of frames, which focus on statistics and other objective
information (McEntire et al., 2015). While some scholarship has established that personal
frames successfully promote altruistic behavior, there has not yet been any systematic,
empirical research to determine whether those individuals would still mobilize when a
campaign was inherently violent and destructive. Given this theoretical foundation and
my research question (What kinds of frames most effectively mobilize support for
VNSAs?), I offer the subsequent hypotheses.
Hypotheses
First, I hypothesize that reading a basic personal frame will increase individuals’
willingness to support the use of violence. I refer to this frame as “basic” due to its lack
of rhetorical devices. The remaining hypotheses, therefore, concern what I have deemed
“amplified” versions of the basic personal frame. The amplified personal frames contain
the same outline of characters and events, but are intensified with humanizing details of
the main character in the narrative, and/or more description of the event or “injustice” in
the narrative (diagnostic frame). Following the assertion that in order for messages to
truly move people to act and particularly, engage in high-risk collective action, the
narrative must cause the audience to “identify, empathize and adopt the beliefs of the
character(s),” (Haven and Seese, 2015, 12) I argue that exposure to any of these amplified
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versions of the personal frame will result in more stated support for violence, than
exposure to just the basic personal frame.
Due to the novelty and exploratory nature of my study, I cannot make any
confident predictions regarding the impact of the different amplified versions of the
personal frame. However, literature surrounding grievances and emotional engagements
suggests that people who experience a significant amount of anger, shock, or frustration
might be more likely to support the use of violence. Furthermore, previous empirical
work concludes that people are more receptive to humanitarian issues when those
affected are framed as “civilians,” a term laden with perceptions of innocence and
vulnerability (Carpenter, 2005). This notion informs my hypothesis that those who
perceive the main character in the narrative as particularly innocent or vulnerable may be
more likely to once again, “identify, empathize, and adopt the beliefs of the character(s),”
which in this case seek to justify the use of violence by way of injustice framing and will
therefore increase support for the use of violence (Haven and Seese, 2015, 12).
Following this reasoning, I also believe that emphasizing the injustice of the
events in the frame may serve to strengthen the perception that the main character is
innocent and vulnerable and therefore, increase willingness to support of violence. As a
result, I posit that exposure to the most amplified personal frame, containing both the
humanizing language and increased details of the injustice, will result in the strongest
support for the use of violence. In the next chapter, I will discuss my methodology for
testing these proposed relationships.
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Chapter Three: Research Design and Methodology
Rationale for Research Design
Given the aforementioned gap in the literature, I chose an experimental survey
method to test the efficacy of personal frames on generating support for violence carried
out by VNSAs.1 I arrived at this research design after careful consideration of several
factors. Due to the personal risk posed by surfing the web for propaganda released by
VNSAs, like the Islamic State (ISIS) and other organizations scrutinized by United States
government agencies, I was prohibited from conducting any systematic, observational
analyses of extant texts. However, even if I could overcome this obstacle and safely
collect and observe primary source propaganda, it does not seem feasible that I could
control for the variation among the variables involved, such as the type of VNSA, its
goals, and the country or conflict context, in order to isolate the effect on my dependent
variable and make any significant conclusions. As a result, it was difficult to know
conclusively what kinds of frames these VNSAs are actually using and how often. In
recent months, however, there has been some research that attempts to deconstruct the
narratives utilized by violent or extremist groups. In an extensive report on ISIS’s
propaganda strategies, Charlie Winter writes,
A June 2015 video from Islamic State’s Nineveh Province…opens with the
depiction of a fighter handling a child’s disembodied arm at an unnamed
bombsite. Shortly after, three groups of alleged ‘spies’ are burned alive in a
car hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, drowned in a steel cage and beheaded
with explosives. The depiction of the child’s corpse at the beginning of the
video is intended to drive home the victimization of Iraq’s Sunnis as well
as justify what followed. (Winter, 2015, 25)

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1
This study was approved by the Human Subjects Research Committee (HSRC) at The
College of Wooster on February 5, 2016
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Reports like this one offer some insight into the messaging techniques that are
often employed by VNSAs. As discussed in Chapter Two, the mass media also provides a
window, however distorted it may be, into the framing strategies of these groups, which
helped inform the development of the personal frames used in this study.2 Even with the
absence of primary source propaganda, the relevant scholarship suggests that there are
strong academic reasons to expect a positive, significant relationship between the use of
personal narratives and consequential support for the violence executed by a VNSA.
Second, an experimental survey method allows for a more systematic and
controlled evaluation of the data and increases the reliability of my findings, which is an
essential component to establishing a legitimate study for future research to build upon.
While experiments have fairly high internal validity, in order to confidently establish any
causal relationships in my study, I included a control group into the experiment, ensured
randomization and made certain that each treatment frame was identical, except for the
specific variables being measured. Furthermore, question design was a crucial part of my
process so as to most effectively capture the impact of the independent variable on the
dependent variable, eliminating any potential confounding variables. The wording of the
survey questions is revisited later in this chapter.
However, like all methods in the social sciences, experimental surveys are not
free from error. One major critique of this methodology lies in its inherent weakness in
generalizability. As such, this study is somewhat limited due the constraints previously
mentioned in analyzing genuine frames produced by VNSAs. Over the course of this
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2
For example, this article from “Albawaba,” a Palestinian news outlet published a story
detailing a young girl’s unjust arrest by Israeli authorities.
(http://www.albawaba.com/news/fourteen-year-old-palestinian-girl-jailed-israeli-courts647638)
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research project, however, new studies have come to light reflecting the current landscape
in Iraq and Syria, where children are not only being used as tools of propaganda to evoke
sympathy, but also as militants and “martyrs” for their cause (Bloom et al., 2016). This
increases the external validity of my study, as the personal frames that are utilized
specifically describe events involving a young girl using violence in association with a
VNSA. To further increase the external validity or generalizability of my findings, I used
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to access a more diverse sample than the alternative
provided by The College of Wooster student population. I also recruited 100 participants
per group for a total (N) of 500 survey respondents to improve the generalizability of the
data.
Variable Measurement
Independent Variable
The independent variable in this study, “group assignment,” is simply the
treatment group to which participants are randomly assigned. Also known as a
categorical variable, each group took a value of 0-4, with 0 assigned to the control group
and 1-4 for the treatments groups, to effectively account for the presence of some
categorical effect that may influence the dependent variable. Participants across every
treatment group saw these basic instructions, “Please read the following story and answer
a short questionnaire,” then read the corresponding personal frame. Those randomly
assigned to the control group were taken directly to the survey questionnaire. The frames
are intentionally analogous to enhance comparability across treatments and read as
follows,
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Basic Personal Frame
On Leila’s 6th birthday, three soldiers entered her home. Her mother was beaten and then, killed.
Leila was left an orphan. Still grieving and enraged at the attack against her mother, four years
later, Leila joined the violent resistance to the regime and participated in an attack that resulted in
the death of a soldier.
Amplified (with “humanizing” language)
Leila had just finished her toast on her 6th birthday when three soldiers entered her home. Leila
remained frozen in her “big girl chair” but kept whimpering “mama, mama, mama…” while her
mother was beaten and then, killed. Leila was left an orphan. Still grieving and enraged at the
attack against her mother, four years later, Leila joined the violent resistance to the regime and
participated in an attack that resulted in the death of a soldier.
Amplified (with event intensification)
On Leila’s 6th birthday, three soldiers burst into her home. One of them grabbed her mother by
the throat and shoved her face onto the white kitchen tile and beat her. Soon, however, the once
sparkling white tiles turned crimson; her mother was gone. Leila was left an orphan. Still grieving
and enraged at the attack against her mother, four years later, Leila joined the violent resistance to
the regime and participated in an attack that resulted in the death of a soldier.
Amplified (with both “humanizing” language and event intensification)
Leila had just finished her toast on her 6th birthday when three soldiers burst into her home. One
of them grabbed her mother by the throat and shoved her face onto the white kitchen tile and beat
her. Leila remained frozen in her “big girl chair” but kept whimpering “mama, mama, mama…”
Soon, however, the once sparkling white tiles turned crimson; her mother was gone. Leila was
left an orphan. Still grieving and enraged at the attack against her mother, four years later, Leila
joined the violent resistance to the regime and participated in an attack that resulted in the death
of a soldier.

The frames contained only general indicators, like “violent resistance” and
“state,” in an effort to eliminate any possibility of mobilizing participants in my survey
towards joining a real VNSA. This also limited potential biases that could arise from
naming a specific VNSA or country context. Still, there was a certain level of deception
involved here, as I imply that the fictional story in each frame is true. However, this
deception is vital to obtaining significant results for analysis and previous research
suggests that even if the subject is suspicious, the deception will not affect performance
and participants will still follow directions “faithfully” (Fillenbaum, 1966).
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Dependent Variables
The dependent variable, “support for violence,” can perhaps be better understood
as a form of mobilization commonly known as “consensus mobilization.” As discussed in
the previous chapter, consensus mobilization refers to the “[purposeful] process through
which a social movement tries to obtain support for its viewpoints” (Klandermans, 1984).
Thus, the dependent variable was measured by the answers provided by participants in
the survey questionnaire regarding the use of violence. However, measuring support for
(or degree of consensus mobilization) violence generated through framing or messaging
techniques has received little empirical attention in the past. Therefore, without much
past instrumentation as a guide, I used two different measures of the dependent variable
to enhance internal validity of the experiment.
The wording of the survey was also consistent across treatment groups to ensure
reliability of the data and was phrased in such a way so that the control group could still
answer the questions in an informed manner. For the first measure of the dependent
variable, participants used an ordinal scale of 1 to 5 to indicate their agreement or
disagreement with the reverse-coded statement, “Violence is never an appropriate
response to any situation.” Additionally, using an ordinal scale of 1 to 5, respondents
were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the statement, “Violence can
be an appropriate response in certain situations.” By presenting the participants with
these opposing statements, I did a “robustness check” to ensure the validity of the data.
Intervening Variables
The intervening variables in this study pertain to the previously stated hypotheses,
the first of which posits that participants who perceive the main character in the narrative
as particularly innocent or vulnerable will be more likely to support the use of violence
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by the VNSA. In order to measure this perception, respondents used a Likert scale from
“Not at all” to “Very well” to indicate how well a list of relevant characteristics described
the main character in the personal frame, Leila.3
Given the effectiveness of “diagnostic” frames, which serve to amplify the
perceived injustice of individuals’ experiences and incite an almost visceral emotional
response and rationale for participation, I also measured the emotional reaction expressed
by each participant after exposed to one of the treatment groups. First, respondents were
asked to describe how well a list of emotional characteristics described their current
emotional state in relation to the materials they read. The list included the following
characteristics, “Angry, Happy, Sad, Shocked, Scared, Frustrated, Disgusted, Calm” and
responses were measured using a Likert scale from “Not at all” to “Very well.” While I
am not certain whether there will be an observed effect on the dependent variable, the
vast amount of literature surrounding grievances and emotional engagements suggests
that participants who indicate higher levels of anger, shock, or frustration might be more
prone to support the violent response described in the narrative.
In addition to the type of emotional reaction that they experience due to the
narrative, respondents were also asked to indicate the extent of their emotional reaction
“when thinking about state violence against women and children,” as well as “when
thinking about groups that use violence against the state,” also using a Likert scale from
“None ” to “A lot.” Those who experience a strong emotional reaction in relation to state
violence against women and children, may be more likely to support the violent response
in the frame, as well as those who view Leila as more innocent, vulnerable, and without
agency. However, I suspect that participants, who indicate a strong emotional reaction in
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3
For the complete list of characteristics and survey questions, please see Appendix A.
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relation to VNSAs or groups that use violence against the state, will be less likely to
support the violent response described in the narrative and view Leila as less innocent
and vulnerable.
Control Variables
In an effort to isolate the effect of the independent variable on the dependent
variable, I controlled for common demographic variables such as, age, gender, education
level and ethnicity. However, due to the extant scholarship and my own life experience,
there were a few other variables that I suspected might have an influence on the
dependent variable. Religion has become such a significant element in the discourse
pertaining to violent non-state actors. While I remain skeptical of the ways these
discussions have been overly generalized, I nevertheless included a question pertaining to
religious affiliation, as well as religiosity, to observe whether there might be a
relationship between certain affiliations and support for violent behaviors. I am also
curious as to whether a higher level of reported religiosity is inversely correlated with
support for violent behaviors.
Following the rather common knowledge that Republicans tend to be more
“hawkish,” or more prone to support the use of force in matters of diplomacy, I included
a political affiliation question with the belief that participants identifying as “Strong
Republican,” will be more likely to support the violent response described in the
narrative. Upon further reflection, however, it became apparent that the same behavior of
being “hawkish,” which ultimately promotes and accepts the use of violence by the state,
might also result in less stated support for the violence described in the narrative, because
it is carried out by a violent non-state actor. Additionally, I controlled for political
efficacy with the expectation that those who indicate a lower level of agency may be
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more likely to support or resort to the use of violence, as they might believe there is no
other legitimate alternative course of action provided by the state. I also included a
question to measure interest in international affairs (“How often do you follow world
news?”), as I expected increased exposure to world events might desensitize an audience
to violence and result in greater stated support for it. Finally, I controlled for participants
who were or have known victims of violence, as those individuals might have less
tolerance for the use of violence and would be less likely to support its use, no matter the
circumstances.
Sampling and Data Collection
Participants for this study were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk, a unique
online program that allows users to pay anonymous workers or “MTurkers” a small
compensation to complete various tasks. Over the past couple years, MTurk has become
established as a popular and reliable source of data for social science research (Berinsky
et al., 2012). It provides swift data collection and a sample size large and diverse enough
to make more generalizable assertions about the impact of personal frames on support for
violence committed by VNSAs. Still, some studies have noted that there are certain
demographic dimensions, such as education level and nationality, which are more
homogeneous than often desired by researchers (Ross et al., 2010; Berinsky et al., 2012).
For example, this system requires Internet access and English language skills and
compared to the entire population, MTurk workers are mostly white, slightly younger,
include a significantly greater number of male members, and tend towards lower levels of
annual income (Huff and Tingley, 2015). In order to participate in my study, workers
were required to be at least 18 years of age, live in the United States, and have a
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completed task satisfaction rate of at least 85 percent. While this was a non-probability,
convenience sample, participants were randomly assigned to either one of the treatment
groups or the control group, to ensure that biases in the population were not systematic.
In reality, VNSAs produce narratives that target specific audiences to play upon
preexisting cultural ties and evoke a stronger emotional response that stimulates
participation and recruitment. But, given the experimental constraints and safety concerns
of this study, I relied on the convenience sample provided by MTurk. In this way, my
study exemplifies a “hard test,” because the participants involved represent a “cold
population” or a group of people who do not have any known preexisting grievances to
target so as to incite a stronger emotional reaction. Consequently, if MTurkers in this
study, who have not experienced the hardship that comes with living in a conflict setting,
are still moved to express support for the use of violence, then one can reasonably expect
that the impact of personal narratives will only become stronger when applied to
aggrieved populations, such as residents of Syria and surrounding countries.
Tasks on MTurk are distributed in the form of a HIT (“Human Intelligence
Task”), where a description of the survey is posted on the site for MTurkers to choose
from among other tasks posted by requesters. MTurkers who selected my task were given
a link that directed them to my survey at Qualtrics.com (online survey software) and were
randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups or the control group. Before
respondents began, however, MTurkers were asked to consent by manually checking a
box that indicated that they have read the consent form, understand the task and reserve
the right to stop the survey at any time. After completion of the survey, respondents were
debriefed. Participants would then receive the stated compensation ($0.50), provided in
part by the generosity of the Henry J. Copeland Grant Committee. Once the data from
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the surveys were collected, it was converted to a STATA dataset. I then conducted
several statistical analyses, including ordered logistic regressions to examine the impact
of the various personal frames on the dependent variable, support for the use of violence
by VNSAs. Ordered logit is used, because the dependent variable is an ordinal measure,
as opposed to dichotomous or continuous measure. In other words, it has more than two
categories and the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order.
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Chapter Four: Data Analysis

	
  

In this chapter, I present the results from my analyses, which measure the impact
of various personal narratives or “frames” on individuals’ willingness to support the use
of violence by VNSAs. First, in an effort to better understand the population in my study,
I created several charts that outline the demographic profile of the sample population.
The total population of the sample was 497.5 Given that random assignment was used in
this experiment, I reasonably expect that there were no statistically significant differences
in the demographics of the sample population across the control or treatment groups.6
Demographics and Descriptive Statistics
	
  
Chart 1: Age Distribution of Survey Respondents
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5
500 MTurkers participated in the survey, however, every participant had to answer a
simple math question (What is 5 minus 2?) to ensure validity of the data. Any respondent
that gave an answer other than 3 was subsequently dropped from the statistical analyses.
Additionally, in order to be included in the regression analyses, respondents had to have
correctly answered at least 1 validity question in relation to the frame or have been
assigned to the control group.
6
Due to time constraints, I was not able to conduct the difference of means t-tests of each
control variable across the groups. However, I have provided a table in Appendix B,
containing all of the descriptive statistics across the control and treatment groups.
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Participants’ profiles appear to be consistent with other studies using MTurk
(Berinsky et al., 2012; Huff and Tingley, 2015), as respondents were mostly white (Chart
2), mostly liberal (Chart 4) and slightly younger than a nationally representative sample.
Additionally, the participants were more highly educated than the U.S. population, with
the majority indicating they had attended at least some college (Chart 3). However, the
sample contained slightly more females than male (52% versus 47%).
Chart 2: Ethnicity Distribution of Survey Respondents
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Chart 3: Education Distribution of Survey Respondents

1%

Professional degree
Graduate degree

15%
40%

College degree
11%

Technical school or associate graduate
Some technical school or college

22%
10%

High School Graduate
Some high school

1%
0%

	
  

5%

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%

29
In terms of self-reported political affiliation, the sample skewed toward the liberal
end of the spectrum. After recoding a seven-category scale (strongly conservative to
strongly liberal) into three categories (conservative, independent, and liberal), 49% were
considered liberal, compared to only 28% conservative, with 23% being independent
(Chart 4).
Chart 4: Political Affiliation of Survey Respondents
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28%

Next, I ran a correlation analysis to check the variables for multicollinearity, the
results of which are presented in Table 1. Given these results, I was able to establish that
the variables in my model were not highly correlated with one another, thus I was able to
include all of them in subsequent analyses.
Dependent Variables
As previously mentioned, measuring support for violence has received very little
empirical attention in the past. Therefore, I examined data from two ordinal measures of
the dependent variable to increase the robustness of my analyses. The first measure was a
reverse-coded statement; “Violence is never an appropriate response to any situation,”
	
  

	
  

	
  
1.000
0.0899
-0.1153
-0.0704
-0.0433
0.0617
0.0011
0.1407
-0.0639
-0.0525
-0.0174

(1) DV

(2) Age
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(4) Religion

(5)
Religiosity
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(7) Education

(8) News

(9) Political
Efficacy

(10) Political
Affiliation

(11) Victim
of Violence

(1)

-0.0313

-0.0198

-0.0392

0.2719

0.1053

0.1464

-0.0410

0.0554

0.0162

1.000

(2)

-0.0964

0.0567

0.0692

-0.1034

-0.1217

0.0656

0.0305

0.1125

1.000

(3)

-0.0150

-0.1406

0.0022

-0.0314

-0.0330

0.0032

0.2328

1.000

(4)

0.0685

-0.1949

0.1192

0.0075

0.0876

-0.0052

1.000

(5)

-0.0878

-0.0136

-0.0376

0.0251

-0.0665

1.000

(6)

0.0687

-0.0048

0.1339

0.1723

1.000

(7)

-0.0406

0.0353

0.2239

1.000

(8)

-0.0423

.1866

1.000

(9)

-0.1199

1.000

(10)

1.000

(11)
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Table 1: Correlation Matrix (obs=490)
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while the second measure explicitly stated, “Violence can be an appropriate response in
certain situations.” I included the reverse-coded measure, because of the potential benefit
of limiting “non-substantive” responses among participants (Weijters et al., 2013, 1).
However, the data collected from the first measure resulted in variation among responses,
while the majority of participants (74%) either agreed or strongly agreed with second
measure. These results suggest that many respondents agreed that violence is both never
appropriate and that it can be appropriate in certain situations and thus, reflects some of
the problems associated with using reverse-coded measures. A recent psychological study
explores the distinct mechanisms that affect responses in reverse-coded measures, finding
that inconsistencies often arise from acquiescence and carelessness in respondents
(Weijters et al., 2013). Therefore, in order to limit any spurious factors in my analyses, I
will focus solely on the more straightforward second measure of the dependent variable. I
have provided a more thorough depiction of the data on each measure in Table 2.
Table 2: Distribution of Dependent Variable Measures (%)
Ordinal Scale
1 Strongly disagree
2 Disagree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Agree
5 Strongly agree

DV Measure 1
(Reverse-coded)
9
29
23
28
12

DV Measure 2
1
6
18
55
19

Below I present the results of the ordered logit models, where I created seven
statistical models to test the impact of various personal frames, as well as perceptions of
innocence and vulnerability, on support for the use of violence. Models 1-4 are presented
in Table 3 and Models 5-7 are shown in Table 4. Each model employs the same control
variables and all models were estimated using STATA software, version 11.3.
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Table 3: The Effects of Personal Frames on Support for Violence (Estimated using
Ordered Logit)
Model 1
Independent Variables
Any Frame v. Control
Basic Frame v. Control
Any Amplified Frame v.
Basic Frame
Most Amplified Frame v.
Single Amplification
Control Variables
Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Religion
Religiosity
Education
News
Political Efficacy
Political Affiliation
Victim of Violence
N
χ2 (12)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

.448* (.212)

-

-

-.017 (.329)

-

-

.513* (.254)

-

-

-

-

-.666** (.260)

.006 (.007)
-.428* (.201)

-.019 (.013)
-.408 (.365)

.014 (.007)
-.378 (.224)

.012 (.009)
-.234 (.256)

.169 (.107)
-.031 (.043)

.329 (.212)
-.081 (.093)

.134 (.112)
-.058 (.049)

.232 (.131)
-.059 (.052)

-.100 (.128)
-.050 (.076)

.194 (.213)
.002 (.123)

-.124 (.145)
-.072 (.088)

-.111 (.173)
-.126 (.104)

.267** (.095)
-.305* (.156)

.351* (.176)
-.047 (.238)

.194 (.107)
-.345* (.170)

.311** (.120)
-.461* (.215)

-.079 (.054)
-.073 (.192)

.026 (.103)
.460 (.356)

-.102 (.061)
-.249 (.215)

-.144* (.070)
-.475 (.257)

435
32.34***

164
18.48

351
33.98***

271
44.21***

Log pseudo-likelihood

-501.34943
-174.66103
-407.24162
-304.4576
Notes: Two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001

In Model 1, the regression revealed that compared to the control group, exposure
to any of the treatments significantly increased one’s likelihood of viewing violence as
appropriate in certain situations. For example, reading any version of the personal frame
(compared to reading nothing) resulted in a positive 0.45 increase in the log odds in
respondents’ view that violence can be appropriate.
Model 2 tests my first hypothesis; “participants exposed to the basic personal
frame will indicate more support for violence, than participants in the control group.” To
begin, I generated a dichotomous variable in STATA. Participants who were randomly
assigned to the control group were recoded as “= 0” and those who were put into
treatment group 1 and read the basic personal frame were recoded as “=1.” Following an
ordered logit regression of the dependent variable comparing the control group to the
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treatment group 1, the relationship was insignificant and I was not able to reject the null
hypothesis. This rather unexpected finding suggests that a basic personal frame is not
enough to generate a significant effect on the level of consensus mobilization towards
support for violence.
Model 3 examines my second hypothesis, “participants exposed to any of the
amplified versions of the personal frame will indicate more support for violence
(consensus mobilization), than participants exposed to just the basic personal frame.”
Once again, I generated a new, dichotomous variable in STATA, where participants who
were randomly assigned to treatment group 1 were recoded as “=0” and participants in
treatment groups 2, 3, and 4 were recoded as “=1.” The results indicated that respondents
who read any amplified version of the personal frame were significantly more likely to
agree that violence can be appropriate in certain situations than respondents who just read
a basic personal frame. In this case, with a statistically significant p–value of less than
0.05, I can successfully reject the null hypothesis (that there is no difference in support
for violence between amplified and basic personal narratives). Therefore, compared to a
basic frame that lacks rhetorical devices, it seems as though the addition of detailed
language pertaining to the main character and the injustice in the narrative more
successfully causes the audience to “identify, empathize and adopt the beliefs of the
character(s),” which can increase the likelihood for individuals to engage in high-risk
collective action (Haven and Seese, 2015, 12).
Unfortunately, due to time constraints, I was not able to conduct the predicted
probabilities to capture the substantive impact of each independent variable on the
dependent variable and therefore cannot answer my hypothesis, “participants exposed to
the most amplified personal frame, containing both the humanizing language and
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increased details of the event, will indicate the strongest support for violence.”
Therefore, I thought it would be interesting to instead compare the effect on support for
violence between the treatment groups with a single amplification - either “humanizing”
or “event intensification” - with those who read the most amplified version of the frame
in Model 4. In other words, I would modify my original hypothesis to “participants
exposed to the most amplified personal frame, containing both humanizing language and
increased details of the event, will indicate more support for violence than those who read
a frame with a single amplification.” To test modified hypothesis, I generated a new,
dichotomous variable where respondents in the “single” amplified frames were recoded
as “= 0” and respondents exposed to the most amplified frame were recoded as “= 1.”
The regression revealed that there was a significant increase in the likelihood of agreeing
that violence can be appropriate when respondents read the most amplified version of the
personal frame.
Table 4: The Effects of Personal Frames on Perception of Innocence and
Vulnerability (Estimated using Ordered Logit)

Independent Variables
Any Amplified v. Basic
“Humanizing” v. Basic
Control Variables
Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Religion
Religiosity
Education
News
Political Efficacy
Political Affiliation
Victim of Violence
N
χ2 (12)

Log pseudo-likelihood

Model 5
Innocent

Model 6
Vulnerable

Model 7
Vulnerable

.632** (.267)

.683** (.265)

.558* (.249)
-

.029** (.010)
.422 (.230)
-.006 (.149)
.094 (.061)
-.150 (.152)
-.233** (.097)
.147 (.109)
-.284 (.164)
.004 (.080)
.227 (.257)
269
34.33***
-293.18499

.021* (.009)
.534* (.243)
.009 (.130)
-.088(.067)
.167 (.146)
-.064 (.098)
.166 (.111)
-.161 (.160)
.104 (.069)
-.485 (.263)
271
28.97***
-264.75671

.558***(.008)
.557** (.210)
-.010 (.111)
-.027 (.059)
.228 (.139)
-.070 (.087)
.119 (.101)
-.078 (.148)
.106 (.058)
-.532* (.228)
351
40.77***
-347.49153

Notes: Two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001
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Table 4 presents the results that tested my final hypothesis, “participants who
perceive the main character (Leila) in the narrative as particularly innocent and
vulnerable will be more likely to support violence.” Responses from survey participants
were measured on a 4-point Likert scale, from “Not at all” to “Very well,” following the
question, “Based on what you just read, how well does each of following characteristics
describe Leila?” Next, I conducted several regressions comparing the perception of
innocence across treatment groups, however the models in Table 4 only present the
regressions that yielded significant results. Model 5 displays that there was a significant
increase (p < 0.05) in the likelihood of perceiving Leila as more innocent when
comparing the responses from those in treatment group 1, who read a basic personal, with
respondents who read the amplified “humanizing” version of the personal frame
(treatment group 2). As a reminder, the only difference between these two narratives was
in the additional details pertaining to Leila (i.e. Leila had just finished her toast on her 6th
birthday when three soldiers entered her home. Leila remained frozen in her “big girl
chair” but kept whimpering “mama, mama, mama…”). However, no other regression
across treatment groups yielded significant results, which suggests that the amplified
“humanizing” frame was most effective in producing a perception of innocence towards
Leila.
When examining the perception of vulnerability, Model 6 shows that participants
who read the amplified “humanizing” version of the personal frame were also
significantly more likely to perceive Leila as vulnerable (p < 0.01), than those who read
just the basic personal frame. Model 7 demonstrates that respondents were significantly
more likely to view Leila as more vulnerable when exposed to any amplified version of
the personal frame (p < 0.05) compared to participants who read just the basic version.
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These findings suggest that reading an amplified version of the narrative, particularly one
that includes details of a character’s personality or behavior, increases the perception of
vulnerability of that character.
Given these results, I examined the perception indicators of “innocent” and then
“vulnerable” as the independent variables against the dependent variable in an effort to
establish a link between whether an increase in the perception of innocence also increases
support for violence. Unfortunately, the results were not significant and I could not reject
the null hypothesis (that perception of innocence and vulnerability does not increase
willingness to support violence).
Taken together, these findings offer some support for my third hypothesis, in so
far as the messaging techniques used in the amplifications were effective in conjuring the
perception of innocence and vulnerability. However, the data also suggests that viewing
someone as more innocent and vulnerable is not sufficient in producing a higher level of
consensus mobilization regarding support for violence.
Intervening Variables
To recap, I discussed three different intervening variables of interest in the
previous chapter. First, as stated in my hypotheses and previously discussed in Models 57, I proposed that respondents who perceived the main character in the narrative as
particularly innocent and vulnerable would indicate a higher level of consensus
mobilization towards violence.
Second, given the literature surrounding grievances and emotional engagements, I
predicted that participants who indicate higher levels of anger, shock, or frustration will
be more likely to support the violent response described in the narrative. To measure
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these emotional reactions, directly after exposure to one of the treatments, participants
were asked, “How well does each of the following characteristics describe your reaction
to the materials you just saw?” Each characteristic was measured using a 4-point Likert
scale, from “Not at all” to “Very well.” After running an ordered logit regression on each
of the ordinal emotion indicators and comparing across treatment groups, only the
emotion “shock” produced a significant effect on the responses between groups. For
example, reading any version of the amplified personal frame resulted in a positive 0.76
increase in the log odds of reporting a higher level of shock (p < 0.00) compared to those
who only read a basic personal frame. This result strengthens theories discussed in
Chapter two surrounding the important role that strong emotions play in serving in
inciting mobilization towards support for violence. However, after running a regression
with the emotion indicator of “shock” as the independent variable on the dependent
variable, in an effort to establish a link between whether an increase in the shock emotion
also increases support for violence, the results were insignificant. Therefore, it seems that
particular emotional reactions, such as shock, are not enough to generate support for
violence.
In addition to the type of emotions experienced after exposure to the narrative, I
wanted to examine the extent or degree of respondent’s emotional reaction when
considering two situations in relation to the narrative they just read. Therefore,
participants were first asked to indicate, using a 4-point Likert scale from “None” to “A
lot,” “How much of an emotional reaction do you experience when thinking about state
violence against women and children?” As well as, “How much of an emotional reaction
do you experience when thinking about groups that use violence against the state?” I
suspected that respondents, who indicate a strong emotional reaction in relation to state
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violence against women and children, might be more likely to support the violent
response in the frame. And on the other hand, I believed that those who indicate a strong
emotional reaction in relation to VNSAs or groups that use violence against the state will
be less likely to support the violent response described in the narrative. The results from
the regressions remain rather ambiguous.
The first measure of the emotional reaction (How much of an emotional reaction
do you experience when thinking about state violence against women and children?) was
only significant when comparing those in the control group against those in any treatment
group (p < 0.05). While this supports the idea that reading a personal narrative produces a
strong emotional reaction, there was no significant change when comparing between
treatment groups. This finding reveals that amplifications of a basic personal frame do
not give rise to any significant effects on the extent of an emotional reaction when
thinking about violence against women and children. However, there already seems to be
a general consensus among the population that violence against women and children is
wrong and therefore the data surrounding this measure is not very useful in distinguishing
between cultural biases and the genuine emotional reactions provoked by exposure to the
personal frames.
The second measure of the emotional reaction (How much of an emotional
reaction do you experience when thinking about groups that use violence against the
state?) is more difficult to interpret, as the survey does not require respondents to
specifically explain their reactions. Still, the personal frames seemed to have an effect, as
the regression revealed that respondents were significantly more likely to indicate a
strong emotional reaction when comparing the control group to any treatment, the basic
personal frame to any of the amplified versions of the frame, as well as when comparing
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the basic personal frame to the amplified “humanizing” frame. However, neither the first
or second measure of the emotional reaction produced significant results in a regression
with the dependent variable (“violence can be appropriate...”). Therefore, I could not
conclude that a stronger emotional response leads to an increase in stated support for
violence.
Control Variables
When examining the control variables across the statistical analyses, the most
consistently significant variables seemed to be “news” and “political efficacy.”
Respondents who said they followed world news “daily” were more likely to agree that
violence can be appropriate in certain situations. This result may indicate that those who
follow news more often are somewhat more desensitized or more accepting of violence,
perhaps because they see it so often, however the genuine cause behind this finding is
beyond the scope of my study. I controlled for political efficacy with the question, “How
much influence do you think you can have in shaping public policy?” The results
revealed an inverse relationship with the dependent variable. In other words, those who
believed they had “none” to little” influence or agency in shaping public policy were
more likely to agree that violence can be appropriate. This finding bolsters my
aforementioned belief that those who believe they have less influence in the public sphere
are more likely to support the use of violence. I find this result rather intriguing, as it
pertains to conflict and violence within democratic states where the level of political
efficacy should be higher than in, say, more authoritative states.
In the regression analyses that tested the impact of the various personal frames on
perceptions of innocence and vulnerability, the control variable “age” was consistently
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significant. In each model the coefficient was positive; therefore, as the age of survey
respondents increased so did the likelihood that they would view Leila as more innocent
and vulnerable. By means of conjecture, I can imagine that older survey participants are
more likely to have children and as a result, feel more protective over Leila, the main
character in the frame.
Several other variables, which I controlled for mostly out of experimental
curiosity, such as religion, or religiosity, and being a victim of violence, were never
significant in any regression, with one exception. When comparing across treatment
group 2 (those who read the amplified “humanizing” version of the personal frame) with
treatment group 1 (the basic frame) in measuring support for violence there was an
inversely significant relationship between religion and the dependent variable. According
to the coding of that variable, those respondents who identified towards the bottom of the
scale (1- “Agnostic” 2- “Atheist”) were more likely to agree that violence can be
appropriate. The variable, “political affiliation” was also significant in one regression,
comparing the most amplified frame to the frames with only a single amplification. The
log-odds coefficient was negative, therefore, participants who identified as more
Republican, were more likely to support violence. This finding offers some support for
the stereotype that Republicans tend to be more “hawkish,” or more prone to support the
use of force in matters of diplomacy.
Discussion
In relation to my research question (What kinds of frames most effectively
mobilize support for VNSAs?), my statistical analyses suggest that reading any personal
frame results in a higher level of stated support for the use of violence when compared to
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those who did not read any frame. However, the basic personal frame, which lacked
rhetorical devices and intimate details of the main character, did not produce a significant
change in responses on the dependent variable when compared to the control group.
Therefore, it’s plausible to conclude that a basic frame is not enough to impact support
for the use of violence. Yet, when this same story is amplified with both humanizing
language and details of the injustice that took place, there is an observable, significant
increase in stated agreement that violence can be appropriate. Thus, my research suggests
that personal stories, which contain ample details of an individual and the injustice that
takes place, are most effective in generating consensus mobilization around the use of
violence.
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Chapter Five: Conclusion

	
  

This study offers the first systematic examination of the effect of personal frames
on consensus mobilization regarding support for violence. My findings demonstrate that
personal narratives, amplified with both “humanizing” language pertaining to the main
character and increased details of an injustice, are more effective at generating support
for violence than a basic version of the same narrative or no narrative at all. Thus, my
contribution to this field begins by reinforcing the fundamental argument of this study –
frames really do matter.
Twenty-three years ago, Robert Entman wrote, “To frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in
such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, 52).
And today, in retrospect of completing this thesis, his words have renewed relevance. The
old adage “one man’s suicide bomber is another man’s freedom fighter,” comes to mind.
That is to say, in a society saturated with violence, it is imperative to remain aware of the
processes of framing and the rather enigmatic ways in which stories construct our reality
so as to contemplate solutions to such violence.
I believe that policymakers and other agents of change, who hope to thwart the
mobilization efforts of violent non-state actors, should not discount the powerful
influence of framing. This means, increasing funding for research projects that critically
and systematically analyze the messaging strategies employed by VNSAs. While my
study reveals that amplified personal frames result in greater willingness to support
violence, those interested in preventing violent mobilization should be wary of simply
invalidating these personal narratives. I believe this course of action may only serve to
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strengthen the perception of victimization and ultimately galvanize more support for
violence, however future research is needed to better understand the consequences of
specific strategies. Despite the limitations that barred me from observing propaganda
constructed by real VNSAs, policymakers cannot ignore the unique contextual factors
that accompany each group, should they wish to develop effective strategies to combat
them.
This experimental study provides valuable insight into the interplay between
personal narratives and support for violence, with high internal, as well as external
validity. However, through this research, I have discovered some important limitations to
experimental surveys, as well as social sciences research in general. First, measuring
opinions and emotions in this context is particularly limited. Respondents are given 5 or 4
options on scale that may or may not capture their view regarding the question, thus it’s
difficult to emphasize the generalizability of the findings, as the data cannot reflect the
nuances of human expression. I found this phenomenon particularly frustrating when
examining results from the intervening variables regarding how much of an emotional
reaction one has when thinking about a particular event. To enhance this study, I might
have provided an additional text box for respondents to explain the reason behind their
emotional reaction in their own words for clearer interpretation after data collection. To
further improve this analysis, I would have liked to conduct predicted probabilities tests
to determine the size and strength of the relationships between the variables, and thus
reflect on which frames were comparatively most successful in generating a greater
degree of consensus mobilization.
My hope is that this study stimulates future research regarding the impacts of
framing techniques on not only consensus mobilization, but also action mobilization.
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Because, while consensus mobilization is a necessary precondition for violence,
ultimately it’s whether one chooses to act with violence that provokes and haunts
researchers and policymakers. Several questions remain, such as, does continued
exposure to personal injustice frames increase one’s willingness to engage in high-risk
collective action? And furthermore, how might the addition of photographs and video
footage to a story, as we observe in the real world, influence violent behavior? We as
researchers must endeavor to answer these questions. As the “battle for the hearts and
minds” continues, obtaining a deeper awareness and understanding of the mechanisms
that lead people to support or utilize violence is essential to forming effective strategies to
combat it.
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire7
Consent: Please read the directions and answer the questions that follow. The survey is
completely confidential, so please answer as honestly as possible. You may refuse to
answer any question or end your participation in the survey at any time. After completing
the survey you will be credited $0.50 to your MTurk account. By clicking next you are
consenting to participate in the survey and certify that you are over 18 years of age.
Thank you for your time.
Please note that this survey may contain sensitive information regarding violence
1. *How well does each of the following characteristics describe your reaction to
the materials you just saw?8

Angry
Happy
Sad
Shocked
Scared
Frustrated
Disgusted
Calm

Not at all

Not very well

Somewhat well

Very well

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()
()

()
()

()
()

()
()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

2. Violence is never an appropriate response to any situation
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neither agree nor disagree ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree
3. Using violence in self-defense is appropriate.
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neither agree nor disagree ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree
4. Using violence to defend a loved one is appropriate.
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neither agree nor disagree ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7
This survey includes a complete example of the survey questionnaire, however it is
important to note that questions marked in gray are not a part of the current analysis
8
Questions marked with asterisks	
  were only shown to respondents randomly assigned to
one of the four treatment groups
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5. Using violence to advance a political goal is appropriate.
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neither agree nor disagree ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree
6. Using violence in retaliation for a past transgression or wrongdoing against you or
a loved one is appropriate?
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neither agree nor disagree ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree
7. Violence can be an appropriate response in certain situations.
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neither agree nor disagree ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree

8. *Based on what you just read, how well does each of following characteristics
describe Leila? At times, you may feel unsure or that you don’t have enough
information. When this is the case, you should guess. Please give a rating for
every characteristic.

Daughter
Victim
Survivor
Innocent
Aggressive
Just
Vulnerable
Brave
Foolish

Not at all

Not very well

Somewhat well

Very well

()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()

()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()

()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()

()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()
()

9. How much of an emotional reaction do you experience when thinking about state
violence against women and children?
( ) None
( ) Little
( ) Some
( ) A lot
10. How much of an emotional reaction do you experience when thinking about
groups that use violence against the state?
( ) None
( ) Little
( ) Some
( ) A lot
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11. We are currently collecting names for a petition to be sent to the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, demanding sanctions against states that
engage in violent attacks against women and children. Would you like to add
your name to the petition?
( ) Yes
( ) No
12. We are currently collecting names for a petition to be sent to the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, demanding immediate action against
those involved in rebel attacks against state militaries. Would you like to add
your name to the petition?
( ) Yes
( ) No
13. We are currently collecting funds to be sent to young children orphaned after
state attacks. Would you like to donate the $0.50 you would otherwise be
credited for completing this HIT to this fund?
( ) Yes
( ) No
14. We are currently collecting funds to be sent to the families of fallen soldiers
recently killed by armed rebels. Would you like to donate the $0.50 you would
otherwise be credited for completing this HIT to this fund?
( ) Yes
( ) No

15. *How old was Leila (in years) at the time of her mother’s attack?
16. *How old was Leila (in years) when she joined the resistance?
17. *How many soldiers were involved in the attack on Leila’s mother?
18. What is 5-2?

19. What is your age in years?
20. Which of the following best describes your gender?
( ) Male
( ) Female
( ) Transgender
( ) Other, please describe _______
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21. Which of the following best describes your religious affiliation?
( ) Agnostic
( ) Atheist
( ) Buddhist
( ) Christian
( ) Hindu
( ) Jewish
( ) Muslim
( ) Other, please describe __________
22. In the past month, how many times have you attended religious services?
()0
( ) 1-2
( ) 3-4
( ) 5 or more
23. Which of the following best describes you?
( ) American Indian or Alaska Native
( ) Asian
( ) Black or African American
( ) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
( ) White/Caucasian
( ) Other, please describe _________
24. Are you Hispanic or Latino?
( ) Yes
( ) No
25. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
( ) Some high school
( ) High school graduate
( ) Some technical school or college
( ) Technical school or associate graduate
( ) College degree (example: BS, BA)
( ) Graduate degree (example: MA, MS, PhD, EdD)
( ) Professional degree (example: MD, DDS, DVM)
26. How often do you follow world news?
( ) Never
( ) Rarely
( ) Several Times a Month
( ) Once a Week
( ) Daily
27. How much influence do you think you can have in shaping public policy?
( ) None
( ) Little
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( ) Some
( ) A lot
28. Which of the following best characterizes your political affiliation?
( ) Strong Republican
( ) Weak Republican
( ) Independent who leans Republican
( ) Independent
( ) Independent who leans Democrat
( ) Weak Democrat
( ) Strong Democrat
29. Charitable giving is an effective way to make a difference.
( ) Strongly disagree ( ) Disagree ( ) Neither agree nor disagree ( ) Agree ( ) Strongly agree
30. In the past year, how many times have you made a financial contribution to a
charitable organization? Please specify below.
31. Have you or a loved one ever been the victim of violence?
( ) Yes
( ) No
If during your participation in this study you experience any symptoms of
psychological distress, please contact the National Helpline, a confidential and free
24-hour service, to speak with a trained professional (1-800-662-HELP).

Debrief: Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of this investigation
is to determine if and how certain messaging techniques affect individuals’ attitudes
toward participation in violent movements. In order to ensure participants’ safety and
wellbeing, we created a fictitious scenario with fabricated characters and details.
Participants were shown varying accounts of a young girl, named Leila, who joins a
“resistance” group following the death of her mother. All participants were asked
questions about their opinions regarding Leila’s decision, as well as their emotional
reactions to the story. We anticipate that participants shown the story containing the most
detailed version of the scenario would be more likely to have a strong emotional reaction
in defense of the victim (Leila) and thus support Leila’s decision to engage in a violent
organization that resulted in the death of another human being. The characters of Leila
and her mother, as well as the story presented, are entirely fictitious. Thank you again for
your participation in this study. If you have any questions or concerns about this study,
please feel free to contact Dr. Michele Leiby at mleiby@wooster.edu or 1-330-287-1951.
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Appendix B: Statistical Tables and Charts
Chart 1: Age Distribution of Survey Respondents
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Chart 3: Education Distribution of Survey Respondents
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Chart 4: Political Affiliation of Survey Respondents
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1.000

0.0899

-0.1153

-0.0704

-0.0433

0.0617

0.0011

0.1407

-0.0639

-0.0525

-0.0174

(1) DV

(2) Age

(3) Gender

(4) Religion

(5)
Religiosity

(6) Ethnicity

(7) Education

(8) News

(9) Political
Efficacy

(10) Political
Affiliation

(11) Victim
of Violence

(1)

-0.0313

-0.0198

-0.0392

0.2719

0.1053

0.1464

-0.0410

0.0554

0.0162

1.000

(2)

-0.0964

0.0567

0.0692

-0.1034

-0.1217

0.0656

0.0305

0.1125

1.000

(3)

-0.0150

-0.1406

0.0022

-0.0314

-0.0330

0.0032

0.2328

1.000

(4)

0.0685

-0.1949

0.1192

0.0075

0.0876

-0.0052

1.000

(5)

-0.0878

-0.0136

-0.0376

0.0251

-0.0665

1.000

(6)

0.0687

-0.0048

0.1339

0.1723

1.000

(7)

-0.0406

0.0353

0.2239

1.000

(8)

-0.0423

.1866

1.000

(9)

-0.1199

1.000

(10)

1.000

(11)

52

Table 1: Correlation Matrix (obs=490)

53

Table 2: Distribution of Dependent Variable Measures (%)

Ordinal Scale
1 Strongly disagree
2 Disagree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Agree
5 Strongly agree

	
  

DV Measure 1
(Reverse-coded)
9
29
23
28
12

DV Measure 2
1
6
18
55
19

54
Table 3: The Effects of Personal Frames on Support for Violence (Estimated using
Ordered Logit)
Model 1
Independent Variables
Any Frame v. Control
Basic Frame v. Control
Any Amplified Frame v.
Basic Frame
Most Amplified Frame v.
Single Amplification
Control Variables
Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Religion
Religiosity
Education
News
Political Efficacy
Political Affiliation
Victim of Violence
N
χ2 (12)

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

.448* (.212)

-

-

-.017 (.329)

-

-

.513* (.254)

-

-

-

-

-.666** (.260)

.006 (.007)
-.428* (.201)

-.019 (.013)
-.408 (.365)

.014 (.007)
-.378 (.224)

.012 (.009)
-.234 (.256)

.169 (.107)
-.031 (.043)

.329 (.212)
-.081 (.093)

.134 (.112)
-.058 (.049)

.232 (.131)
-.059 (.052)

-.100 (.128)
-.050 (.076)

.194 (.213)
.002 (.123)

-.124 (.145)
-.072 (.088)

-.111 (.173)
-.126 (.104)

.267** (.095)
-.305* (.156)

.351* (.176)
-.047 (.238)

.194 (.107)
-.345* (.170)

.311** (.120)
-.461* (.215)

-.079 (.054)
-.073 (.192)

.026 (.103)
.460 (.356)

-.102 (.061)
-.249 (.215)

-.144* (.070)
-.475 (.257)

435
32.34***

164
18.48

351
33.98***

271
44.21***

Log pseudo-likelihood

-501.34943
-174.66103
-407.24162
-304.4576
Notes: Two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001

Table 4: The Effects of Personal Frames on Perception of Innocence and
Vulnerability (Estimated using Ordered Logit)

Independent Variables
Any Amplified v. Basic
“Humanizing” v. Basic
Control Variables
Age
Gender
Ethnicity
Religion
Religiosity
Education
News
Political Efficacy
Political Affiliation
Victim of Violence
N
χ2 (12)

Log pseudo-likelihood

Model 5
Innocent

Model 6
Vulnerable

Model 7
Vulnerable

.632** (.267)

.683** (.265)

.558* (.249)
-

.029** (.010)
.422 (.230)
-.006 (.149)
.094 (.061)
-.150 (.152)
-.233** (.097)
.147 (.109)
-.284 (.164)
.004 (.080)
.227 (.257)
269
34.33***
-293.18499

.021* (.009)
.534* (.243)
.009 (.130)
-.088(.067)
.167 (.146)
-.064 (.098)
.166 (.111)
-.161 (.160)
.104 (.069)
-.485 (.263)
271
28.97***
-264.75671

.558***(.008)
.557** (.210)
-.010 (.111)
-.027 (.059)
.228 (.139)
-.070 (.087)
.119 (.101)
-.078 (.148)
.106 (.058)
-.532* (.228)
351
40.77***
-347.49153

Notes: Two-tailed tests; robust standard errors in parentheses; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001
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Table 5: Demographic Profile of Control and Treatment Groups
Variable
Age (mean years)
Gender (%)
Religion (%)

Male
Female
Other
Agnostic
Atheist
Buddhist
Christian
Hindu
Jewish
Muslim
Other

Control
39.56
48
52
0
52
0
1
53
1
0
0
5

T1
37.25
50
50
0
19
22
3
49
0
2
1
4

T2
39.72
46
51
1.9
23
10
2
52
1
1
2
9

T3
41.72
53
47
0
23
18
2
47
0
1
0
9

T4
35.96
40
60
0.9
23
14
2
47
1
1
1
12

Aggregate
38.75
47%
52%
.6%
22%
16%
2%
50%
0.60%
1%
0.80%
8%

Religiosity, mean
Religious services
1=0 - 4=5 or more
attended monthly
Ethnicity (%) American Indian/Alaska
Asian
Black/African American
Native Hawaiian/Pacific
White/Caucasian
Other
Education (%) Some high school
High school graduate
Some technical school or college
Technical school or associate grad.
College degree
Graduate degree
Professional degree

1.52
0
7
5
1
86
1
2
16
18
11
40
12
1

1.51
0
8
10
0
80
2
2
12
24
15
39
9
0

1.45
3
7
5
0
84
2
1
9
27
11
38
13
1

1.43
2
8
8
2
77
2
0
6
17
7
45
24
1

1.6
0
4
4
0
92
1
2
8
26
12
30
19
4

1.5
1%
7%
6%
0.60%
84%
2%
1%
10%
22%
11%
40%
15%
1%

News, 1=never 5=daily

How often do you follow
world news?

4.04

3.96

3.94

4.08

4

4

Political Efficacy,
1=none - 4=a lot

How much influence do
you think you can have
in shaping public policy?

2.05

1.99

1.97

2.01

2.1

2

4.18
39
61

4.38
38
62

4.68
33
67

4.47
41
59

4.41
40
60

4.4
38%
62%

85

101

105

96

110

497

Political Affiliation, 1=strong Republican
7=strong Democrat
Victim of Violence (%)
Yes
No
N (total population)
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